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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal allocation of decision rights between an uninformed principal
and an informed agent when interdependent activities need to be adapted to local conditions.
While the principal cares only about overall prots the agent may favor higher, or lower, levels
for each activity than the prot-maximizing level. The principal has limited commitment power
and can only commit to an ex-ante allocation of decision rights. Whenever the principal retains
some (or all) decision rights the agent communicates his information strategically, i.e. via
cheap talk. We show that if activities are complementary the principal can always improve
the informativeness of communication by sharing control with the agent, while sharing control
over activities that interact as substitutes always worsens communication. As a result of this
communication advantage, sharing control over complementary activities can be optimal, while
control over activities that interact as substitutes is optimally allocated to the same party.
Keywords: authority, cheap talk, incomplete contracts
JEL classications: D23, D83, L23
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1 Introduction
The allocation of decision rights is a key determinant of the performance of organizations. To
allocate decision rights e¢ ciently, organizations must resolve a trade-o¤ between information and
control: on the one hand, the e¢ cient utilization of local information requires that decision rights
are allocated to the best informed party (Jensen and Meckling 1992) but, on the other hand,
doing so may expose the organization to the costs of biased decision making (Jensen and Meckling
1976, Jensen 1986). The resolution of this trade-o¤ is made more di¢ cult when decisions are
interdependent. In particular, the organization must then take into account how the allocation
of control over one decision a¤ects the incentives of agents to communicate information relevant
for other decisions. In this paper I analyze the optimal allocation of decision rights between an
uninformed principal and an informed but biased agent in the light of such interdependencies. More
specically, I analyze organizational design in a setting in which the only formal mechanisms are
the allocation of control rights and the informed agent communicates via cheap talk.
The central result in this paper is that the principal may be willing "to trade control for
information". In particular, we show that when two activities A1 and A2 are complementary, the
principal can induce the agent to communicate more information relevant for activity A1 if she
gives the agent control over activity A2. This communication advantage can be su¢ ciently large to
compensate the principal for her loss of control when delegating activity A2. As a result, sharing
some control rights with the agent can be optimal when activities are complementary. In contrast,
sharing control over substitutive activities worsens communication, and thus sharing control is
never optimal.
There is ample evidence that organizations assign control rights over interdependent activities
to di¤erent decision makers. For instance, Taggart (1987) reports that investments decisions on
new product lines and expansions of existing product lines are often made by di¤erent levels of a
hierarchy (see Harris and Raviv 2002 for a discussion of these ndings). Likewise, the authority to
deploy new production facilities typically lies with the CEO or division manager while investments
in plant expansion, upgrades and maintenance are made at the technical or plant manager level.1
In many multidivisional rms corporate headquarters has active oversight over certain functional
activities, while divisions have wide discretion in making operational decisions.2 A concrete ex-
1Also, control over capital decisions are sometimes disassociated from related human resource policies (e.g. sta¢ ng,
training or job assignment). For instance, in the context of Italian manufacturing rms, this separation of control
over capital and labor decisions has been reported by Colombo and Delmastro (2004).
2Alternative reasons for centralizing certain activities involve gains in coordination, when these activities have a
rm-wide impact, and exploitation of economies of scale (i.e. when headquarters acts as a "shared service" provider,
e.g. in centralizing payroll services).
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ample is provided by Information Technology (IT), where corporations have alternated between
centralizing IT-investment decisions (giving rise to the position of the Chief Information O¢ cer
(CIO)), or allowing their business units freedom to pursue their own IT projects subject to gen-
eral budgetary constraints, often with mixed results (see HBR 2000). The di¢ culty in nding the
e¢ cient governance structure for IT related decisions may stem from the observation that these
investments are complementary to, for instance, investments in product variety and design, and
human resources policies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002, Gao
and Hitt 2004). In this paper we argue that one benet of letting a corporate CIO have authority
over IT decisions is the improved communication of the information held by the business units.
To study how the allocation of control a¤ects the quality of communication between informed
and uninformed parties I analyze a model with the following characteristics: (i) An organization
that consists of a principal and agent must select the levels of two interdependent activities A1 and
A2. Activities A1 and A2 may interact as complements, when the marginal return to each activity
increases with the level of the other activity, or interact as substitutes, when the marginal return to
each activity decreases in the level of the other activity.3 (ii) Principal and agent have conicting
preferences in that their preferred levels for each activity depend on the realization of the state of
the world and do not in general coincide. (iii) Contracts are highly incomplete and the principal
can only commit to an ex-ante allocation of control over each activity. In particular, the principal
can control both activities (P-Authority), delegate both activities to the agent (A-Authority), or
transfer control over one activity to the agent while retaining the right to set the level of the other
activity (S-Authority). (iv) After the initial allocation of control, the agent learns the realization
of the state. If the principal has control over some (or all) activities the agent communicates his
private information strategically, i.e. communication between principal and agent takes the form
of "cheap talk".
The impossibility of paying the agent according to the information revealed implies that in
equilibrium communication is noisy and information is lost. As in Crawford and Sobel (1982)
(henceforth CS 1982) and Melumad and Shibano (1991) (henceforth MS 1991), cheap talk equilibria
under P-Authority and S-Authority are characterized by a partition of the state space into intervals,
where the only substantive information transmitted is the interval where the actual realization of
the state lies.4 A natural question then is if an informed agent is willing to share more precise
3See Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
4We will posit that if the agent controls both activities no communication takes place. Indeed, since in this case
the principal makes no decisions the agent may fully reveal his private information but will have no impact on nal
outcomes.
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information with his principal when he enjoys more control rights. We show that the agent may
reveal more or less information when he gains control over one activity, where the informativeness
of the agents message depends on the nature of the interaction in a simple manner: while the
principal can always improve the quality of communication by sharing control over complementary
activities, communication worsens when control is shared over substitutive activities.
In essence, by granting formal authority over one activity to the agent, say A2; joint decision
making will feature a game of strategic complements (if activities are complementary) or strategic
substitutes (if activities are substitutes), where the agents message conveys information both about
the state and his intended decision. In turn, the principal will react to the anticipated decision
of the agent by adjusting the level of A1 away from her preferred level if she controlled both ac-
tivities. Therefore, by sharing control the principal can commit to act on the agents information
di¤erently than if she centralized decision making. We show that this change in the responsiveness
of the principal dampens the agents incentive to misrepresent his private information (relative to
the centralized case) when activities are complementary, but intensies the agents incentive to
misrepresent his information when activities interact as substitutes. Thus, in our specication,
shared control over complementary activities exhibits a communication advantage over centraliza-
tion, while the reverse is true if activities interact as substitutes.
The main nding is that this communication advantage may result in the optimality of sharing
control over complementary activities. In order to shed light on this result we rst consider as a
benchmark the case in which communication is imperfect, but non-strategic, and does not vary
with the allocation of decision rights. Given the symmetry across activities in our specication, we
show that sharing control is never optimal in this case: an enhanced willingness to share control
also makes A-Authority (i.e. complete delegation) very attractive.
The fact that the allocation of control endogenously determines the quality of communication
drives the main result: not only can the principal improve communication by sharing control over
complementary activities, but she is willing "to trade control for information" whenever the conict
of interest is mild. The analysis considers both the case in which the agent favors higher decisions
than the principal, and thus has an incentive to overstate his information, and the case that the
agent favors lower decisions, resulting in his incentive to understate his information. While the
comparison between the communication performance of P-Authority and S-Authority does not
qualitatively depend on the type of agent, we show that communication is comparatively worse
in the second case, i.e. when the agents incentive is to understate his information. This implies
that in our model, the principal shares control with her agent only if the latter has an incentive to
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overstate his information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section we discuss the related
literature. Section 3 presents the model which is solved in Section 4. Section 5 compares the
quality of communication under centralization to the quality of communication when the principal
shares control. Section 6 describes the performance of the di¤erent organizational arrangements
and Section 7 determines under which conditions the principal selects each arrangement. Finally,
I conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Literature
Allocation of Authority in Organizations: There is a vast literature that analyzes the optimal
allocation of decision rights in the presence of incentive conicts when information is distributed
throughout an organization.5 A substantial body of work has considered the complete contracting
case that, following a mechanism design approach, analyzes optimal decision rules when contracts
can specify what decisions are made under every contingency. Under complete contracting, however,
the allocation of authority is often indeterminate: a given decision rule maybe implemented by
granting authority to the agent and conditioning his compensation on the decisions he makes, or by
centralizing decision making and compensating the agent according to the information transmitted.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986), when contracts are incomplete the allocation of authority
does a¤ect the set of attainable decision rules. In particular, our assumption that decisions are ex-
ante and ex-post non-contractible is in line with a number of recent papers that study organizational
design with ex-post asymmetric information when only the allocation of decision rights can be
specied. The literature so far has considered di¤erent degrees of contractual incompleteness: (i)
decision rights can be contracted ex-ante and ex-post, (ii) decision rights can only be contractually
specied ex-ante.
When decision rights can be contractually specied both ex-ante and ex-post, the organizational
designer can employ revelation mechanisms that specify an allocation of control and a set of transfers
for every set of messages that informed parties might send. This contracting over control has
been considered, for instance, by Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004) and Bester (2005).6 In a
5The literature on team theory also analyzes decision making in organizations when information is dispersed and
physical constraints impose limits on communication (e.g. Marshak and Radner 1972, Radner 1993, Bolton and
Dewatripont 1994, Van Zandt 1999). This literature, however, abstracts from incentive considerations. In contrast,
in our paper, the quality of information ows is determined by the inherent incentive conict between principal and
agent. In Section 7.1 we briey compare our results to a setting where communication is imperfect but una¤ected by
incentive conicts.
6See also Aghion and Bolton (1992), Aghion and Rey (2002), Hart and Moore (2005), Hart and Holmstrom (2002)
and Krähmer (2006).
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dynamic setting, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004) show that a principal can induce truthful
revelation of the agents information by making delegation of a rst period decision contingent on
the agents message.7 Bester (2005) identies more general situations in which truthful revelation
of information can be achieved. It follows that, in these cases, asymmetric information does not
impose an e¢ ciency loss with respect to the full information case, in which control rights are
allocated contingent on the realized state.
A second strand of the literature argues that contracting over control is not feasible ex-post
(for instance, because once the agent reveals his private information the principal may have an
incentive to renege on his promise and make decisions herself), and contracts can only establish who
has formal authority over each decision.8 We distinguish two cases: (i) control can be transferred
ex-post if it is in the interest of the party with authority to do so,9 (ii) the initial allocation of
control rights determines who ultimately makes each decision.10
In the rst case, Aghion and Tirole (1997) make the distinction between "formal" and "real"
authority, i.e. the di¤erence between who has formal control over decisions and who actually
makes decisions, to highlight the possibility that control may be credibly transfered even when the
parties cannot contractually commit to do so.11 More related to our paper, Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey (2002, 2004) and Gautier and Paolini (2002) analyze in a dynamic setting the notion of
"transferable control" where, by delegating control in the rst period to the agent, the principal can
infer the agents type through his equilibrium action. This is benecial if the principal can use this
information to make decisions herself in later stages. Thus, as in our paper, partial delegation of
authority may enhance the information that the principal obtains from the agent. In these papers
information revelation operates through a "signaling mechanism": delegation in the rst period
allows the agent to credibly signal his type through his choice of action. In contrast, in our paper
information transmission does not rely on the ability of the agent to credibly signal his type: when
control is shared, decisions are made simultaneously.
7 In the case of Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004) the state of the world corresponds to the agents willingness
to cooperate in the future.
8Even when neither decisions nor control over decisions can be credibly allocated, an uninformed principal can
still use the power of message games to elicit information from an informed agent. This ex-post contracting over
information has been considered by Krishna and Morgan (2005), who, for the leading example of Crawford and Sobel
(1982) and when the agent is protected by limited liability, nd that although the principal can induce full revelation
of information by the agent this is never optimal, i.e. the optimal contract involves noisy communication by the
agent. In contrast, in our setup the principal has limited commitment to shape the communication protocol and thus
"paying for information" is not credible.
9See Aghion and Tirole (1997), Gautier and Paolini (2002) and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2002, 2004).
10See Dessein (2002), Ottaviani (2000) and Marino and Matsusaka (2005).
11Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduce this distinction to study how the allocation of formal authority a¤ects the
incentives of principal and agent for information acquisition.
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Our paper follows the strand of the literature that assumes that the limited commitment of the
principal restricts her contractual choices to an ex-ante allocation of decision rights, i.e. only the
party originally in charge can exercise its right to make a decision. In this sense our paper is closest
to Dessein (2002) that explores a principals choice between delegation to an agent and centralization
of decision rights when the agent communicates his information via "cheap talk". A central insight
of Dessein (2002) is that despite the increased informativeness of communication when the conict
of interest reduces, the principal prefers to delegate control rather than engage in communication
precisely when the conict of interest is not too pronounced. Dessein (2002) considers a single
decision and thus the allocation of authority does not a¤ect the quality of communication. In
contrast we explore a setting with multiple, interdependent decisions where di¤erent decisions can
be allocated to di¤erent parties. Thus we are able to show that the quality of communication
does indeed depend on the allocation of control, and derive its relation to the nature of interaction
between decisions.12
Cheap Talk: In our setup the agent communicates via "cheap talk". Therefore this paper is
related to the literature that follows CS (1982). The specication of the preferences of principal
and agent, however, are closer to MS (1991) since we allow for the possibility that under certain
realizations of the state the agent has no incentive to distort his private information (see also Stein
1989, Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek 2006 and Rantakari 2006). The point of departure in our
analysis is that by contrasting the case in which an agent has an incentive to overstate his private
information to the case in which he has an incentive to understate his private information, we show
that "cheap talk" equilibria are qualitatively di¤erent: while an innite number of equilibria are
possible if the agents incentives are to overstate his private information, only a nite number of
equilibria are possible if he would like the principal to believe that the realization of the state is
lower than its actual value.13
Under shared control both principal and agent select a decision after the agent has commu-
nicated his private information. In this sense this paper also follows the literature that considers
pre-play communication between players when there is one-sided asymmetric information (e.g. Far-
12 In our model information is "localized", i.e. the agent acquires all relevant information prior to decision making.
Other papers consider situations in which information is dispersed throughout the organization (i.e. no party can
make a fully informed decision without engaging in communication) and thus the problem of information aggregation
is central to organizational design. See Stein (2002), Harris and Raviv (2005), Friebel and Raith (2006), Dessein,
Garicano and Gertner (2005), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006) and Rantakari (2006).
13Our paper also di¤ers from Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006) and Rantakari (2006) in that they consider
multiple senders that observe independent pieces of information (see Battaglini 2004 for the case in which the informa-
tion of senders is imperfectly correlated) while in our setup one party (the agent) has all the relevant information for
decision making. Also Battaglini (2002) and Krishna and Morgan (2001) analyze cheap talk equilibria with multiple
senders that observe the same piece of information.
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rell 1987, Baliga and Morris 2002). For instance, Baliga and Morris (2002) provide conditions for
the existance of a full revelation equilibrium of the cheap talk stage and, alternatively, conditions
under which pre-play communication does not expand the set of equilibrium outcomes, i.e. com-
munication is uninformative. In contrast, in our setup communication by the agent under shared
control is noisy but informative, unless the conict of interest is extreme.
3 The Model
An organization is composed of a principal (she) and an agent (he) that need to choose the levels
y1 2 R+ and y2 2 R+ of two interdependent activities A1 and A2. The prots of the organization
(y1; y2; ) depend on y1 and y2 and a random variable  in the following fashion:
(y1; y2; ) = KP   (y1   )2   (y2   )2 + 2y1y2; (1)
where the state of the world  denotes the conditions under which the organization operates, 
captures the nature and degree of interaction between both activities and KP  0 is some constant
level of prots. This simple specication of prots captures the two sources of interdependence in
our model. First, for a given state  the marginal return to each activity will depend on the level
of the other activity. 14In particular, if  > 0 activities are complementary, in the sense that the
marginal return to each activity increases with the level of the other activity. Similarly, if  < 0
activities are substitutes since the marginal return to each activity decreases with the level of the
other activity. Activities are independent if  = 0: Second, for a xed yj , the marginal return to
activity Ai; i 6= j; will depend on the realized state . In this symmetric specication an increase in
 will produce the same variation in the marginal return to each activity. In summary, to optimize
performance, the organization needs to simultaneously adapt activities to each other and also to
its underlying environment.
Preferences: We assume that the principal cares about the overall performance of the organi-
zation, i.e. the utility of the principal is uP (y1; y2; ) = (y1; y2; ). From (1) it follows that the
levels yP1 () and y
P
2 () that maximize prots are given by
yPi () =

1
1  

; i 2 f1; 2g : (2)
In contrast, the agents utility is given by
uA (y1; y2; ) = KA   (y1   (1 + a) )2   (y2   (1 + a) )2 + 2y1y2; (3)
14With a slight abuse of notation we will denote the random variable and its realization by . To avoid confusion
the exposition will make clear exactly what object we have in mind.
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where the adaptation bias a >  1 captures the discrepancy between the need of principal and agent
to adapt decision yi to the state, and KA  0 is some constant level of utility.15 We will make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (existence of equilibrium): jj < 1:
Assumption 2 (desirability of information): jaj < 1+jj :
Assumption 3 (desirability of control):  >  12 :
Assumption 1 simply ensures that optimal decisions exist for principal and agent. Assumption
2 is made for convenience in the exposition and ensures that the principal benets from improved
communication when sharing control with her agent.16 Finally, Assumption 3 guarantees that the
principal always benets from controlling more activities.
Expressions (1) and (3) imply that 2 ( + yj) and 2 ((1 + a)  + yj) describe the marginal
benet of increasing yi to principal and agent, respectively. Thus, if the principal knows the
realization of  and has control over Ai she would set yi according to the decision rule rPi (yj ; )
where
rPi (yj ; ) =  + yj i 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= j: (4)
If the agent has control over Ai, however, he would set yi according to the decision rule rAi (yj ; )
where
rAi (yj ; ) = (1 + a)  + yj i 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= j: (5)
Clearly if a = 0 principal and agent are completely aligned: for given  both would make the
same choice if they had control over activity Ai, i 2 f1; 2g . If a 6= 0 the principal and her agent
di¤er in their preferred level of activity Ai: When a > 0 an agent is reactive in the sense that
he would tend to overadapt to the environment by selecting higher levels than the principal for
each activity, i.e. rAi (yj ; ) > r
P
i (yj ; ): Conversely, if a < 0 the agent is passive in that he has an
incentive to select lower levels of activity Ai, i 2 f1; 2g ; than the principal, i.e. rAi (yj ; ) < rPi (yj ; ).
There may be several reasons why the principal and agent perceive a di¤erent productivity
for a given activity. For example, it has often been voiced that managers have a propensity to
engage in "empire building," are shortsighted with respect to the future benets of their choices,
or have sunk their human capital in certain technologies making them averse to changes brought
about by innovation in the product lines that they manage. Another reason is that observed
15The fact that the state  has an equal impact on the marginal return to each activity for the principal and
the agent is not an essential feature of our model. Indeed, one could always translate a specication with di¤ering
marginal returns per activity to the symmetric specication (1) and (3) as long as the ratio of the coe¢ cient in the
linear terms in  for principal and agent is the same across activities.
16 In Section 7 it will shown that if Assumption 2 is violated the conict of interest is so extreme relative to the
interaction between decisions that the principal optimally retains control over both activities.
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incentives, in the form of pay for performance, may not completely align the preferences of owners
and managers over (y1; y2): For instance, Athey and Roberts 2000 argue that providing incentives to
elicit e¤ort by rewarding division managers upon a measure of divisional performance may distort
their investment choices when investments have rm-wide repercussions.17 We can interpret (1) and
(3) as the reduced-form formulation of a situation in which the agents choice of (y1; y2) imposes an
(state-dependent and additive) externality on the organization that he does not fully internalize.
For instance, a passive agents choice of (y1; y2) may impose a positive externality on the rest of the
organization, resulting in underinvestment in both A1 and A2 relative to (2), or a reactive agents
may impose a negative externality on the rest of the organization, resulting in overinvestment in
both A1 and A2 relative to (2).
In summary, we will consider four cases in our analysis, based on whether activities are com-
plementary ( > 0) or substitutes ( < 0), and whether the agent is passive (a < 0) or reactive
(a > 0).
Information: At the time of contracting it is common knowledge that the state  is uniformly
distributed in 
 = [0; s]. Thus the parameter s captures the extent of ex-ante uncertainty over the
environment faced by the organization. After the initial contract has been signed by both parties
the agent costlessly learns the realization of . An important assumption of our model is that
information is "soft, " i.e.  is non-veriable or, alternatively, can be made veriable at a rather
high cost.
Contracts and Communication: We follow the incomplete contracting literature (Grossman and
Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990 and Hart 1995) in assuming that the principal has available a
limited number of institutions to regulate decision making. In particular, the principal can only
commit to an ex-ante (deterministic) allocation of decision rights. Thus the principals limited
commitment implies that she is unable to contract over decisions, either ex-ante or ex-post, nor
can she compensate the agent di¤erently depending on the information transmitted. Furthermore,
once the agent is informed authority over decisions cannot be credibly transferred.
We consider three possible organizational regimes that di¤er on the identity of the party with
authority over activity Ai; i 2 f1; 2g. Under P-Authority (which we occasionally refer to "central-
ization") the principal retains control over both activities A1 and A2, and asks the agent to report
his private information prior to the decision making stage. Under A-Authority ("delegation") the
principal transfers control over A1 and A2 to the agent, who makes decisions y1 and y2 after learning
. Finally, under S-Authority ("shared control") the principal retains control over A1 and transfers
17See also Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2005) and Friebel and Raith (2006).
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activity A2 to the agent.18 Prior to decision making the agent reports his private information after
which decisions are made simultaneously.19
Whenever the principal controls some (or all) activities, the agent communicates his private
information through an informal mechanism: cheap talk. In this sense the message sent by the agent
is "unmediated, nonbinding and payo¤-irrelevant" (Aumann and Hart 2002). It is well known in
the cheap-talk literature20 that several rounds of communication can expand the set of equilibrium
outcomes: more can be achieved through long conversations than with a single message sent by the
informed party. It is still an open question, however, what the "optimal communication protocol"
would be in settings like the ones studied in CS (1982) and MS (1991). We follow Alonso, Dessein
and Matouschek (2006) in arguing that given the limited commitment of the principal to structure
the relation with the agent, it seems reasonable to focus on the simplest informal communication
mechanism.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal decides on an allocation of decision
rights between herself and the agent. Second, the agent learns the realization of the state . If
control over both activities is transferred to the agent (A-Authority), he makes decisions y1 and
y2. If both activities are centralized or control is shared, the agent sends a single, unmediated,
and costless message m. Under P-Authority, upon reception of the message m the principal makes
decisions y1 and y2: Under S-Authority, the principal and agent simultaneously select y1 and y2,
respectively. For all possible allocations of decision rights, once decisions are made payo¤s are
realized and the game ends.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we dene the equilibrium solution that will be used and analyze equilibrium behavior
for each possible allocation of control. Since, in our framework, whenever the principal transfers
control of both activities to the agent the latter does not engage in communication, the equilibrium
under A-Authority will be determined by the pair of decision rules

yA1 () ; y
A
2 ()
	
that maximize
18Given the symmetry of activities in our model it is clear than the principals expected utility would be unchanged
if instead she retained control over A2 and delegated A1 to the agent.
19Our model a¤ords an alternative "delegation" interpretation in which the agent is delegated both decisions at the
outset and the principal can potentially reverse both decisions (P-Authority), reverse only one decision (S-Authority),
or commits not to interfere in the agents choice (A-Authority). To make the analogy complete, under S-Authority
the principal only observes the agents choice over the decision that she can reverse. Anticipating that the principal
will reverse any decision that is not ex-post optimal given the information revealed by the agents choice, the agent
will select decisions that he is sure to be rubberstamped by the principal. In this setting, equilibrium outcomes would
be equivalent to our model with communication.
20See Aumann and Hart (2002) and Krishna and Morgan (2004).
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the agents utility for each possible realization of the state . Whenever the principal retains some
control rights, however, the agent communicates with her prior to decision making. Although the
equilibrium strategies are di¤erent if the principal centralizes all decisions or shares control with
her agent, we shall refer to both cases as a communication equilibrium.
Formally, a communication equilibrium under P-Authority and S-Authority is characterized
by (i.) a communication rule for the agent, (ii.) decision rules for the decision makers (principal
under P-Authority and principal and agent under S-Authority), and (iii.) a belief function for
the principal. The communication rule for the agent species the probability of sending message
m 2 M conditional on observing state ; and we denote it by  (m j ). Under P-Authority the
decision rule maps the message m into decisions y1 2 R+ and y2 2 R+ which we denote by
yP1 (m) ; y
P
2 (m)
	
. Under S-Authority the decision rule for the principal maps the message m into
a decision y1 2 R+; denoted by yS1 (m), while the decision rule for the agent maps the message
m and the state  into a decision y2 2 R+, denoted by yS2 (m; ). Finally, the belief function is
denoted by p ( j m) and states the posterior probability assigned by the principal to state  after
receiving message m.
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the communication game which require that (i.)
the communication rule is optimal for the agent given the decision rules, (ii.-a) under P-Authority
the decision rule of the principal is optimal given the belief function, (ii.-b) under S-Authority the
decision rule for each decision maker is optimal given the equilibrium decision rule of the other
player and the belief function, and (iii.) the belief function is derived from the communication rule
using Bayesrule whenever possible.
We will solve for an equilibrium by backward induction and thus we start by characterizing
equilibrium decision rules under A-Authority, P-Authority and S-Authority. In Section 4.2, we
study how the incentives of the agent to strategically misrepresent his information vary with the
activities under the control of the principal. These incentives will be captured by the communication
bias that describes the relative desire of a reactive agent to overstate, and a passive agent to
understate, his private information. We then characterize all PBE of the communication game in
Section 4.3. The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
4.1 Decision Making
The next lemma characterizes equilibrium decision making under A-Authority, P-Authority and
S-Authority.
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LEMMA 1 (Decision Making) i- A-Authority: Under A-Authority equilibrium decisions satisfy
yAi () =

1
1   +
a
1  

; i 2 f1; 2g : (6)
ii- P-Authority: Consider a PBE of the communication game under P-Authority and suppose that
the principal receives message m. Then equilibrium decisions satisfy
yPi (m) =
1
1  E [ jm ] ; i 2 f1; 2g : (7)
iii- S-Authority: Consider a PBE of the communication game under S-Authority and suppose that
the principal receives message m. Then equilibrium decisions satisfy
yS1 (m) =

1
1   +
a
1  2

E [ jm ] ; (8)
yS2 (;m) =

1
1   +
a
1  2

E [ jm ] + (1 + a) (   E [ jm ]) :
Under A-Authority the agent has full exibility in adapting each activity both to the realization
of  and to the level of the other activity. Therefore decision making fully utilizes the agents
private information. Whenever a 6= 0, however, the agents choice (6) will di¤er from the principals
preferred decision, as given by (2), i.e. delegation to the agent induces biased decision making
if preferences are dissonant. Furthermore, this bias
yAi ()  yPi () = jaj = (1  ) ; i 2 f1; 2g ;
increases whenever the adaptation bias jaj or  increases.
Under P-Authority the principal can avoid the previous distortion in decision making by making
both decisions herself. Nevertheless, whenever the message m does not perfectly reveal ; decision
making does not incorporate all available information in the organization, and as a result decisions
are poorly adapted to the environment. In the extreme, when the message is completely uninfor-
mative, the principals choice is constant over the state space, i.e. yPi (m) =
1
1 E [] ; i 2 f1; 2g. In
this case the quality of communication is so poor that the principal cannot improve with respect
to the situation in which she bases decisions solely on her prior.
Finally, under S-Authority both principal and agent will adjust the decisions under their control
based on the information transmitted by the agent. To understand (8), let 
 (m)   denote the
subset of the state space where the agent sends message m. As shown in (5), for a xed y1
the agents optimal choice of y2 depends linearly in , thus yS2 (;m) incorporates a linear term
(1 + a) (   E [ jm ]). Furthermore, the principal will optimally choose y1 based on E [ jm ] and
the average decision made by the agent in  2 
 (m). As a result we have that average equilibrium
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decisions for 
 (m) are given by21
yS1 (m) =

1
1   +
a
1  2

E [ jm ] ; (9)
E

yS2 (;m) jm

=

1
1   +
a
1  2

E [ jm ] :
This expression allows us to give an alternative interpretation of (8) by noting that (9) would be
the outcome of joint decision making if both principal and agent share the same posterior E [ jm ]
over the state, and simultaneously make decisions y1 and y2, respectively. Therefore, (8) reects
the fact that equilibrium decisions under shared control are adapted to each other only on the basis
of the information shared by the agent, while the agent is able to use his precise knowledge of  to
further adjust y2 to the environment.
An immediate implication of (9) is that both decisions will be biased in expectation with re-
spect to the principals preferred choice. Indeed, since activities interact, decision making under
S-Authority will feature a game of strategic complements if  > 0, and strategic substitutes if  < 0.
As a result, for each m the principal will react to the agents expected choice of y2 by adjusting
y1 away from her rst best choice by an amount y1(m)   E

yP1 () jm

= a
1 2E [ jm ] ; while on
average the agent will alter y2 with respect to the case of A-Authority by E

yA2 ()  yS2 (;m) jm

=
a
1 2E [ jm ].22 As a result, the indirect e¤ect of centralizing activity A1 on the agents average
choice of y2 will be a reduction in the extent by which the agent biases y2 if activities are complemen-
tary, while it will increase the di¤erence
E y2(;m)  yP2 () jm when activities are substitutes.
Finally, as was true under A-Authority, average decision making under S-Authority will be further
away from the principals ideal choice whenever the adaptation bias jaj or  increases.
Given equilibrium decisions we now turn to the incentives of the agent to strategically mis-
represent his information. Since, as mentioned earlier, communication takes place only if the
principal retains some control rights, we will focus in the next two subsections on P-Authority and
S-Authority.
4.2 Incentives to Strategically Misrepresent Information.
Whenever a principal relies on the information of an agent for decision making the latter has an
incentive to distort his message to accommodate decisions to his self-interest. In the context of our
21Note that the agent could conceivably use the possibility of communication with the principal in order to commit
to di¤erent decision rules. However since communication is costless in our setting this commitment device would not
be credible. See Baliga and Morris (2002) for a general discussion of this issue when both sender and receiver play a
game after the cheap talk stage.
22 In order to compare the bias in decision making we are implicitly assuming that the message m generates the
same posterior under P-Authority and S-Authority.
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model, a passive agent would want the principal to believe that the state is lower than is true value,
while a reactive agent would want her to believe a higher realization of the state. In this section we
seek to quantify the incentive of a reactive agent to overstate, and, conversely, of a passive agent to
understate, his private information as a function of the activities under the control of the principal.
We start with P-Authority.
P-Authority : Suppose that when the realized state is  the agent is able to convince the
principal that the true state is actually bP . What would be the optimal bP from the perspective
of the agent? If the principal makes decisions according to the rule
 
yP1 (); yP2 ()

the agent would
select bP () such that
bP () 2 argmax
0
  (yP1 (0)  (1 + a) )2   (yP2 (0)  (1 + a) )2 + 2yP1 (0)yP2 (0)): (10)
Since in equilibrium the principal acts on given information according to (7), we can solve (10) to
nd that bP () = (1 + bP );
where bP is the communication bias under P-Authority that satises
bP = a: (11)
First, we have that for a reactive agent bP > 0; and for a passive agent bP < 0, thus corroborating
our previous claim that a reactive agent, who favors higher decisions than the principal, has an
incentive to overstate his private information while a passive agent, who favors lower decisions than
the principal, has an incentive to understate his private information. Second, the relative desire
to overstate or understate , as given by
bP ()   = jbP j , is linear in . In particular, for
 = 0 principal and agents preferred decisions coincide and thus the agent has no incentive to
misrepresent his private information. This incentive increases, however, as the state becomes more
extreme.23
Second, changes in the adaptation bias jaj that increase the conict of interest between principal
and agent also exacerbate the agents incentive to misrepresent his private information. Intuitively,
a higher conict of interest leads to a higher discrepancy between the preferred decisions of principal
23 In Section 4.3 we will show that this does not necessarily imply that communication corresponding to higher
states of the world is less informative. Indeed, we will see that messages corresponding to higher states are less
informative only for a reactive agent.
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and agent. Since decision making under P-Authority is una¤ected by the agents preferences, a
more "biased" agent would be compelled to magnify the distortion in his message.
S-Authority: We now turn to the incentives of the agent to misrepresent his information if the
principal shares control with him. We proceed as before by inquiring what bS would the agent want
the principal to believe that is the value of his private information. If the principal believes that
the state is bS , and given that the agent will react by selecting y2 according to (8), the principal
will set y1
bS according to (8) with E [ jm ] = bS . Since the agent has full exibility in selecting
y2; however, he will jointly determine
bS ; y2 such thatbS ; y2 2 argmax
0;y2
  (y1(0)  (1 + a) )2   (y2   (1 + a) )2 + 2y1(0)y2: (12)
The solution to (12) is direct: since it follows from (8)that the agent can potentially induce any
decision y1 through his choice of bS , he can implement his rst-best choice of (y1; y2) ; as given by
(6), by setting bS according to bS = (1 + bS) ;
where the communication bias under S-Authority bS satises
bS =
a
(1 +  (a+ 1))
: (13)
In essence, under S-Authority the agent can always set y2 to his preferred level given the true
state , as given by (6). This leaves him with the sole purpose of inducing the principal to set
y1 at the agents preferred level, as given by (6). Joint decision making, however, implies that
the principals choice of y1 will no longer concord with her preferred choice under P-Authority,
as given by (7), but rather by the equilibrium level when she reacts to the agents anticipated
choice of y2. As we discuss in Section 5 it is this responsiveness of the principal that results in the
amount of information transmitted by the agent di¤ering signicantly if decisions are complements
or substitutes. Finally, the qualitative nature of communication and the comparative statics under
S-Authority are similar to the case of P-Authority.24
24First, the qualitative nature of the communication bias in our model does not depend on the allocation of
decision rights: a passive agent would have an incentive to understate his private information and, conversely, a
reactive agent to overstate his private information, irrespective of the decisions controlled by the principal. Also,
whenever  = 0 the agent has no incentive to distort his message, and the extent of the distortion, as measured bybS ()   = jbS j ; increases with . Thus, from a communication perspective, the interests of principal and agent
are perfectly aligned at  = 0 and diverge at a constant rate as the state increases. Second, as preferences become
more dissonant the agents incentive to misrepresent his private information increases. Formally this follows from
@ [bS ] =@a = (1 + ) = ( + a + 1)
2 > 0.
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We defer to Section 5 a full comparison of the impact of the allocation of authority on the
strategic transmission of information by the agent after we analyze in the next subsection how the
equilibrium quality of communication relates to the communication bias of the agent.
4.3 Communication Equilibria
We now turn to the characterization of the communication equilibria under P-Authority and S-
Authority. We rst show that, as in CS (1982) and MS (1991), all communication equilibria are
interval equilibria in the sense that the state space is partitioned into intervals and the agent only
reveals the interval in which the true state lies.25 Thus communication is noisy and information is
lost in decision making, where it will be shown that this loss depends directly on the corresponding
communication bias bl, l 2 fP; Sg as dened in (11) and (13), respectively. We also show that
communication is qualitatively di¤erent if the agent has an incentive to overstate or understate his
information. When the agents incentive is to overstate his private information there are innitely
many communication equilibria which di¤er in the amount of information transmitted. In contrast,
we will show that only a nite number of equilibria are possible if the agent has an incentive to
understate his information. This will imply, among other things, that strategic communication is
comparatively worse with a passive agent.
Let aN  (a0; :; ai; ::; aN ), with ai 1 < ai; be a partition of [0; s] into N disjoint intervals, where
a0 = 0; and aN = s.26 Since the nature of strategic communication is qualitatively di¤erent if
bl > 0 or bl < 0 we discuss each case separately.
4.3.1 Communication with a Reactive Agent.
When the agent has an incentive to (weakly) overstate his private information, and interests coincide
at some state, there are an innite number of equilibria of the communication game.27 The following
proposition characterizes all nite equilibria of the communication game for bl > 0, l 2 fP; Sg.
PROPOSITION 2 (Communication Equilibria bl > 0). If bl > 0 then for every positive integer N
there exists at least one equilibrium ((); yl1(); yl2(); p()), where
25One di¤erence between CS (1982) and MS (1991) and this paper is that under S-Authority parties play a game
after the cheap talk stage, instead of autonomously making decisions based on the message received. In spite of this
di¤erent structure, the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4 show that the agents equilibrium communication rule will take
the form of an interval equilibrium.
26As all communication equilibria will be shown to be interval equilibria for expositional brevity we will refer to a
given equilibrium by the partition aN induced in the state space.
27This is also a feature of the cheap talk equilibria considered in Stein (1989), MS (1991), Alonso, Dessein and
Matouschek (2006), and Rantakari (2006).
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i. (m j ) is uniform, supported on [ai 1; ai] if  2 (ai 1; ai):
ii. p ( j m) is uniform, supported on [ai 1; ai] if  2 (ai 1; ai).
iii. P-Authority:

yl1(); yl2()
	
=

yP1 (m) ; y
P
2 (m)
	
; as given by (7).
S-Authority:

yl1(); yl2()
	
=

yS1 (m) ; y
S
2 (m; )
	
; as given by (8).
iv. The partition aN satises ai+1   ai = ai   ai 1 + 4blai:
Moreover, all other nite equilibria induce decisions as a function of the state that are equivalent,
almost everywhere, as those in this class for some value of N:
Part (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 raties our previous claim that communication equilibria are
interval equilibria in which the only substantive information transmitted is the interval in which the
true state lies. Now let the precision of a given message m be the inverse of the residual variance
given m, i.e. 1=E
h
(   E [jm])2 jm
i
: Then part (iv) establishes that the size of the intervals
i+1 = ai+1   ai increases with , and thus the precision of a message m 2 [ai+1; ai] decreases as
the state becomes more extreme. To see this, note that the principals decision(s) will be based
on the conditional expectation of the state  given the agents message m, i.e. on E [jm]. Since
the agent has an incentive to overstate , the agents indi¤erence at state ai between consecutive
intervals requires that the distance to consecutive conditional expectations must increase. Given a
uniform distribution this is only possible if the size of consecutive intervals increases as well. As a
result, the informativeness of communication with a reactive agent worsens as the agents incentive
to misrepresent his information, given by bl, increases. Moreover, since the amount by which the
agent exaggerates his private information is proportional to the state it is then intuitive that the
rate at which communication deteriorates also increases with :
We now turn to the equilibrium e¤ectiveness of communication which we describe by the resid-
ual variance of the message E
h
(   E [jm])2
i
: We will also occasionally refer to the variance of
communication for each organizational regime 2l = E
h
(E [jm]  E [])2
i
, l 2 fP; Sg, where clearly
E
h
(   E [jm])2
i
= 2   2l . Proposition 2 establishes that there is an innite number of commu-
nication equilibria.28 We next show that the limit of strategy proles and beliefs as the number
of intervals grows indenitely constitutes an equilibrium of the communication game, and that this
equilibrium is ex-ante preferred by both principal and agent under P-Authority and S-Authority
to any other equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 3 (Innite Equilibrium). The limit of strategy proles and beliefs ((); yl1(); yl2();
p()) as N ! 1 is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game. This equilibrium
28This also implies that there is no uniform upper-bound on the precision of the message sent by the agent. Indeed,
there is always a message m, associated with a partition close to the state  = 0 where the interests of principal and
agent coincide, such that the precision of message m exceeds any given number M .
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is the most informative equilibrium and, given Assumption 2, ex-ante Pareto dominates any nite
equilibrium. In particular the residual variance of communication in this equilibrium is given by
2   2l =
4bl
4bl + 3
2 l 2 fP; Sg . (14)
This proposition establishes that there is an upper-bound on the quality of communication with
the agent which is attained in the equilibrium with an innite number of intervals. Moreover, the
quality of communication varies with the communication bias in a simple manner, where it is readily
seen that the residual variance increases whenever bl increases. This conrms the intuitive result
that for any allocation of decision rights communication worsens whenever the agents incentive to
distort his information increases. Communication is perfect if there is complete alignment between
principal and agent (a = 0) and breaks down (i.e. is completely uninformative) as bl becomes
arbitrarily large.
As it is often the case in cheap talk models, the presence of multiple equilibria makes equilibrium
selection a delicate matter. Nevertheless, Proposition 2 indicates that, for the case of a reactive
agent, all nite equilibria are ex-ante Pareto dominated by the equilibrium described in Proposition
2 and it is thus natural that we focus on the latter when assessing the expected utility of the principal
under each organizational arrangement.
4.3.2 Communication with a Passive Agent.
The following proposition characterizes all communication equilibria under P-Authority and S-
Authority whenever bl < 0, l 2 fP; Sg.
PROPOSITION 4 (Communication Equilibria bl < 0). If bl < 0 then there exists a positive integer
N (bl) such that, for every N with 1  N  N (bl) ; there exists at least one equilibrium ((); yl1();
yl2(); p()), where
i. (m j ) is uniform, supported on [ai 1; ai] if  2 (ai 1; ai):
ii. p ( j m) is uniform supported on [ai 1; ai] if  2 (ai 1; ai):
iii. P-Authority:

yl1(); yl2()
	
=

yP1 (m) ; y
P
2 (m)
	
; as given by (7).
S-Authority:

yl1(); yl2()
	
=

yS1 (m) ; y
S
2 (m; )
	
; as given by (8)
iv. The partition aN satises ai   ai 1 = ai+1   ai   4blai:
Moreover, all other equilibria induce decisions as a function of the state that are equivalent, almost
everywhere, as those in this class for some value of N:
A key insight of Proposition 4 is that strategic transmission of information by a passive agent
always leads to a bounded number of equilibria, in spite of the interests of principal and agent
coinciding at state  = 0: CS 1982 already showed that if the principals and agents preferred
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decisions never coincide it must be the case that only a nite number of di¤erent communication
equilibria are possible. Therefore Proposition 4 states that this could also be the case if the
interests of both parties coincide at some state, as long as the agent has an incentive to understate
his information. To see why this is the case, we analyze the indi¤erence condition in part (iv..).
Since the agent would want the principal to believe that the state is lower than its true value,
for the agent to be indi¤erent at ai between sending two consecutive messages it must be that
the di¤erence between consecutive conditional expectations must decrease as  increases. Given a
uniform distribution this is possible only if the size of the intervals also decreases with , raising
the informativeness of the message m as the state becomes more extreme. However, if there is an
equilibrium with an innite number of partitions it must be that the informativeness of the message
increases as partitions approach the state in which the principals and agents preferred decisions
coincide, i.e.  = 0, which is inconsistent with the decrease in informativeness of the message as
 ! 0.
We now turn to the analysis of the quality of communication with a passive agent. The next
proposition describes the quality of communication for the equilibrium with the highest number of
partitions N (bl).
PROPOSITION 5 (Residual Variance bl < 0). (i) The equilibrium with the highest number of
partitions aN(bl) is the most informative equilibrium. In particular, whenever bl >  1=2 the residual
variance of communication is given by
2   2l =
4 jblj
4bl + 3

3 (1 + bl)
sin2N (bl)'
  1

2 l 2 fP; Sg , (15)
where ' = tan 1 2
p
jblj(bl+1)
2bl+1
and N (bl) satises 2j'j   12  N (bl)  2j'j + 12 . For bl   1=2;
2l = 0:
(ii) 2   2l is weakly increasing in jblj.
(iii) Given Assumption 2, the principal and agent prefer the equilibrium aN(bl) to any other equi-
librium.
The comparative statics for the residual variance are as expected: communication is less infor-
mative as the conict between principal and agent intensies. In particular, for bl <  1=2 the only
possible equilibrium is the babbling equilibrium in which communication is uninformative. Also,
we can substantiate our claim that communication with a passive agent is comparatively worse
than with a reactive agent. By comparing (14) and (15) we see that for two agents B1 and B2, and
a xed allocation of decision rights, if the communication biases satisfy bB1l + b
B2
l = 0 with b
B1
l > 0;
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then 2l

bB1l

> 2l

bB2l

. This di¤erence stems from the niteness of communication equilibria
for a passive agent and, as we will see in Section 7, will render allocations of authority that rely on
communication comparatively less desirable when the agent is passive. Finally, given Assumption
2, all equilibria are ex-ante Pareto dominated by the most informative equilibrium and, as in the
case of a reactive agent, it is natural that we focus on the latter when assessing the expected utility
of the principal under each organizational arrangement.
5 Allocation of Authority and the Quality of Communication
In this section we derive our main results concerning the question of if and when the agent will
reveal more information to the principal when he enjoys some control over activities. We will show
that: (i) the agent may reveal more or less information when the principal shares control with
him, (ii) whether the principal can improve communication by sharing control will be determined
by the nature of the interaction between activities: if activities are complementary the principal
always improves communication with respect to the centralized case by delegating one activity to
the agent, while if activities interact as substitutes communication actually worsens if control over
activities is shared.
It may seem odd that an agent who gains control over one activity will be less forthcoming
in revealing his private information. In principle, if under symmetric information moving from
centralized to shared control leads to equilibrium decisions that make the agent better o¤, it
follows that decisions under shared control are "closer" to the agents preferred choices than under
centralization, and he would thus reduce the distortion in his message. Indeed, if the principal could
commit to making one decision, say y2, according to the agents decision rule (4), the agent would
be willing to share more information with the principal regardless of the nature of the interaction
between activities.29 Intuitively, the agent is more willing to communicate precise information if the
principal takes his interests into account. If the agent has control over A2, however, he is no longer
29This is true given our assumptions except for the case of an extremely biased passive agent and substitute
activities in which a+  <  1: To see this, note that now the principals choice satises
y1(y2; ) =  + y2
y2(y1; ) = (1 + a) + y1:
Clearly, equilibrium decisions in this case are equivalent to average equilibrium decisions under shared control, as
given by (9), for the same posterior mean of the state. We can compute the communication bias ebP under P-Authority
in this case to obtain ebP = a (1 +  (a+ 1))
(a+ 1 + )2 + (1  2) :
As long as 1 + a+  > 0 we have that
ebP  < jbP j :
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concerned in a¤ecting decision making in both decisions, since he has full exibility in adjusting
y2 to his ideal choice (1 + a) = (1  ) , but in inducing the principal to set y1 to the agents ideal
choice for A1; i.e. inducing the principal to set y1 = (1 + a) = (1  ) .
In our model, the mechanism by which the agents incentives to misrepresent his information
vary with the allocation of decision rights lies in the di¤ering responsiveness of the principal to
the information communicated by the agent. In essence, delegating activity A2 to the agent allows
the principal to commit to respond to the agents information di¤erently than if she centralized
decision making. For example, when activities are complementary, transferring control of A2 to
a reactive agent will make the principal bias her decision upwards by an amount a=
 
1  2 in
response to the agents expected choice of y2.30 This increase in the responsiveness of the principal
implies that in this case the agent would need to overstate his information less to induce a choice
of y1 = (1 + a) = (1  ) . The opposite is true if decisions are substitutes: if a reactive agent
controls A2 the principal will respond to the agents message by biasing her decision downwards
by an amount a jj =  1  2. As a result the agent would need to overstate his information more
to induce his preferred choice of y1. The following proposition states that the principal can always
improve communication by sharing control over complementary activities, while communication
worsens when control is shared over activities that interact as substitutes.
PROPOSITION 6 (Communication Comparison). Suppose a 6= 0 and let 2P ; 2S ; be the variance
of communication under P-Authority and S-Authority, respectively.
i. If activities are complements ( > 0) then 2P (a; )  2S (a; ) and
2S (a; )  2P (a; ) increases in :
ii. If activities are substitutes ( < 0) then 2P (a; )  2S (a; ) and
2P (a; )  2S (a; ) increases in jj :
Figure 3 depicts the variance of communication 2S (a; ) and 
2
P (a; ) for jj = 0:3. The
proposition shows that a commitment to be more responsive to the agents message can lead
to better communication only when activities are complementary and that the communication
advantage of S-Authority over P-Authority for complementary activities increases with the strength
of the complementary of activities, while the communication advantage of P-Authority over S-
Authority increases with the strength of interaction for substitute activities. To see this, note that
in our model communication under P-Authority is una¤ected by : since both principal and agent
perceive the same interaction between activities they would both scale their preferred choices by the
same amount in response to a change in . However, the strength of the interaction does a¤ect the
responsiveness of the principal under shared control. This can be seen from (7) and (8) by noting
30See our discussion in Section 4.1.
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that
yP1 (m)  yS1 (m) = jajE [ jm ] =  1  2 which increases in . Intuitively, the principal will
react more to the expected choice of the agent the higher her perceived interaction between A1 and
A2: This results in improved communication if she shares control over complementary activities
and worse communication if she shares control over substitute activities.
In summary, the allocation of decision rights and the nature of the interaction between activities
determines the amount of information that reaches the principal. Moreover, granting the agent
formal authority over some decisions does not result in improved communication: if activities
are substitutes more information will reach her if she centralizes all decision making.31 In the
next section we analyze how the informativeness of communication and the lack of congruence
between principal and agent a¤ect the expected utility of the principal under each organizational
arrangement.
6 Organizational Performance
When assessing each allocation of decision rights the principal compares the loss of control from
biased decision making and the loss of information when decision making does not incorporate
all available information to the organization. Under P-Authority, the principal ensures unbiased
decision making, but she must rely on a noisy estimate of the state to make decisions. This lack of
precise information may cause equilibrium decisions to be far from the principals rst-best choice.
Under A-Authority control is transferred to the inherently best informed party, and all pertinent
information is employed in decision making. However, the conicting goals of principal and agent
lead to equilibrium decisions that are suboptimal for the principal. An intermediate solution, S-
Authority, leads to both losses, albeit in di¤erent magnitude. First, under S-Authority the principal
reacts to the agents expected choice of y2 by adjusting y1 away from her rst-best choice. As a
result, shared control induces biased decision making in both decisions. Second, as a result of noisy
communication joint decision making will take place under asymmetric information, implying that
(i) both y1 and y2 will be adapted to each other only on the basis of the posterior mean of the
state based on the message of the agent, and (ii) the agents ex-post informational advantage will
allow him to locally adjust y2 to his precise knowledge of . Thus, information is incorporated into
equilibrium decisions asymmetrically, where the decision controlled by the agent is more sensitive
to the underlying environment than the decision under the control of the principal.
31We can also cast this result under the "delegation" interpretation introduced in Footnote 20: if the principal can
commit not to interfere in one decision (S-Authority), she is able to "rubberstamp" more decisions if activities are
complementary than if she cannot commit not to interfere in both decisions (P-Authority), while the reverse is true
when activities interact as substitutes.
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In this section we characterize the performance of each organizational regime, and in the next
section we analyze the principals optimal choice for the di¤erent parameter values of our model.32
To this end, let Ll = E

uP
 
yP1 (); y
P
2 (); 
 E uP  yl1(); yl2(); , l 2 fA;P; Sg ; where yPi ();
i 2 f1; 2g ; is given by (2) and yl1(); yl2()	 are given in Propositions 2 and 4, denote the loss in the
expected utility of the principal under organizational regime l when compared to rst-best decision
making. The next proposition characterizes this loss for each allocation of decision rights.
PROPOSITION 7 (Organizational Performance). The expected loss to the principal Ll for each
organizational regime l 2 fA;P; Sg is given by
P-Authority: LP = LX
 
2   2P

where LX = 21  :
A-Authority: LA = 4LAC
2 where LAC =
2
1 a
2:
S-Authority: LS = 4LSC
2   LSC
 
2   2S

+ (LX + LL)
 
2   2S

;
where LSC =
a2
1 2 and LL = a
2   1:
We analyze each of these losses in detail.
P-Authority : Decision making under centralization is hindered by the agents imperfect revela-
tion of his private information. This loss of information depends on two factors: (i) the quality of
communication under P-Authority
 
2   2P

, and (ii) the principals relative value of information,
as given by LX = 2=(1   ). The relative value of information to the principal increases with the
strength of the interaction for complementary activities, and decreases with the strength of the
interaction if activities are substitutes. Intuitively, when activities are complementary a slight vari-
ation in the underlying environment leads to changes in the marginal returns to each activity that
reinforce each other, resulting in substantial variations in the optimal levels for both activities. The
opposite is true when activities are substitutes: slight changes in the underlying conditions may
have little impact on optimal levels since substitutability of activities tends to be self-correcting.33
Thus relying on an imprecise signal of the state is more costly when activities are complements,
since the optimal level for both activities may be quite far from the average optimal level. Finally,
since decision making under P-Authority is una¤ected by the agents preferences, the adaptation
bias of the agent a¤ects performance only through its impact on the quality of communication: As
shown in Section 4.2 an increase in jaj worsens communication, thereby reducing the desirability
32Judging the performance of each organizational regime on the basis of the principals expected utility follows
from our assumption that contracts only specify an ex-ante allocation of decision rights and transfers are not allowed.
Allowing for (unconstrained) transfers between the two parties would shift the focus to allocations that maximize
expected joint surplus. In this case, decision making under shared control leads to intermediate decisions between
the principals and agents ideal points and may yield higher joint surplus, even under perfect information, than
P-Authority or A-Authority. However, if the weight of the principals utility on joint surplus is su¢ ciently high, the
results and insights in Section 7 will remain valid if ex-ante contracting over decision rights is feasible.
33See Siggelkow (2002) for a discussion of this topic in the context of misperceptions of interactions between
complementary and substitute activities.
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of centralizing decision making.
A-Authority : Under A-Authority the agent enjoys full control over activities and thus decision
making makes full use of his private information. The implied cost of delegating all activities to
the agent is that equilibrium decisions will be sub-optimal from the principals perspective. As
expected, this loss of control under delegation increases with jaj : Therefore, the same changes in
the preferences of the agent that reduce the expected utility of the principal under centralization
also reduce her expected utility under delegation. This is consistent with Dessein 2002 in that
variations in the conict of interest between principal and agent that make delegation to an agent
less desirable also have an adverse e¤ect if the principal retains control over decisions and relies on
the information communicated by the agent.
S-Authority : Under S-Authority the principal incurs both types of losses: biased decision
making and under-utilization of the agents information. First, the loss of control is given by
4LSC
2   LSC
 
2   2S

: In particular, if communication is perfect (2S = 
2) the loss under S-
Authority will be LS = 4 a
2
1 2
2: As in the case of A-Authority this loss increases at an increasing
rate with the adaptation bias jaj. Also, by noting that LAC=LSC = 2 (1 + ) ; and recalling that there
is no loss of control under P-Authority, it can be seen that the principal experiences decreasing
returns to control if activities are complements and increasing returns to control if activities are
substitutes.34 Essentially, the indirect e¤ect of sharing control on the agents choice has a disci-
plining e¤ect when activities are complementary, by forcing his choice of y2 to move closer to the
principals ideal choice, but exacerbates the bias in y2 when decisions interact as substitutes.35
Second, consistent with the fact that information is incorporated asymmetrically into decision
making, the loss of information (LX + LL)
 
2   2S

has two components. First, LX
 
2   2S

captures the loss in communication resulting from activities being adapted to each other only on
the basis of the information communicated by the agent. Each factor in this loss of communication
has the same interpretation as in the case of P-Authority. Second, there is a gain (or loss if a > 2)
in local adaptation LL
 
2   2S

since the agent can use his ex-post informational advantage to
34 It should be noted that in our model the principal always reduces the loss of control by centralizing one activity.
This follows from Assumption 3 that states that, absent informational considerations, more control is always desirable.
35 Intuitively, the principals incentive to select a lower y1 than a reactive agent indirectly reduces the agents
marginal return to A2 when activities are complements, dampening the agents relative desire to select a high y2:
Conversely, the principals incentive to select a higher y1 than a passive agent increases the agents marginal return
to A2; inducing him to select a higher y2: This gain from indirectly controlling the agents behavior is largest when
the agents decisions are farthest away from the principals preferred decisions. As a result, the reduction in the loss
of control is larger when the principal moves from A-Authority to S-Authority than if the principal further centralizes
all decision making. If activities interact as substitutes, however, a reactive agent will face a higher marginal return
from A2 when the principal controls A1, leading him to select an even higher level of y2: The principal can avoid this
increase away from rst best in the agents choice of y2 by centralizing A2: Thus the reduction in the loss of control
is larger in this case when the principal moves from S-Authority to P-Authority.
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further adjust y2 to his precise knowledge of . This gain (or loss if a > 2) is proportional to
the quality of communication. Intuitively, the higher 2i the smaller the informational advantage
of the agent and, consequently, the smaller the gain from adjusting y2 according to the exact
value of . Also, the gain/loss LL does not depend on the strength of the interaction between
activities: for a given message, and thus a xed decision by the principal, the agents choice of
y2 varies with  according to (1 + a) . This has one important implication in our analysis: as 
increases, the value to the principal of incorporating information symmetrically to both decisions
(given by LX
 
2   2i

) increases over the gain of local adaptation LL
 
2   2S

: In particular, as
the strength of the interaction between complementary activities increases, the principal will favor
the allocation of decision rights that elicits more information from the agent.36
The fact that the principals loss under S-Authority reduces whenever communication is more
informative also implies that the performance of S-Authority decreases with the adaptation bias of
the agent jaj. As a result under all three organizational arrangements, a higher conict of interest
reduces the expected utility of the principal.
Finally, Proposition 7 together with Propositions 3 and 5, show that the loss Ll; l 2 fA;P; Sg ;
is proportional to the underlying uncertainty 2 faced by the principal at the contracting stage.
This implies that the optimal allocation of decision rights will not vary with variations in 2. This
feature of our model is not robust, however, to changes in the underlying preferences of principal
and agent. For example, if instead of preferences being completely aligned when the state is zero
one allows for some misalingment at that state37 then the optimal allocation of authority will
indeed vary with 2: Nevertheless, the comparative analysis of each governance structure will be
complicated by the fact that the quality of communication will in general not lend itself to simple
algebraic manipulations.
36We also note that the quality of communication
 
2   2S

a¤ects all components in the loss function under
S-Authority. For instance, the loss of control 4LSC
2   LSC
 
2   2S

increases and the gain in local adaptation
LL
 
2   2S

reduces whenever the agent communicates more precise information. It is therefore not immediate
that the principal would be better o¤ under S-Authority if the quality of communication improves. However, from
Assumption 2 it follows that LX  LSC +LL > 0, i.e. the principal always benets from better communication as long
as jaj < 1 + 1
b
 (It will become apparent in Section 7.2 the next section that if jaj > 1 + 1
b
 the conict is so severe
that the principal optimally centralizes all decision making). In summary, if the conict of interest is not extreme,
the reduction in the loss of communication whenever the agent reveals more information outweighs the increase in
the loss of control under S-Authority and the reduction in the gain from local adaptation.
37For instance, by considering the utility function with non-zero constant biases uA (y1; y2; ) =  (y1  (1 + a1)  
d)2   (y2   (1 + a2)    d)2 + 2by1y2)
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7 Principals Delegation Choice
This section analyzes the principals optimal assignment of decision rights as a function of the
adaptation bias a and the degree of interaction between activities . Our analysis proceeds in two
steps. First, in Section 7.1 we introduce a benchmark case in which the amount of information
that reaches the principal under P-Authority or S-Authority is exogenously given. The analysis of
this case will make it clear that the only possible rationale in our model for a principal to share
control with her agent is to improve the quality of communication. In Section 7.2 we proceed to
characterize the principals optimal delegation choice when information transmission is strategic.
We will then see that the communication advantage of S-Authority over P-Authority when activities
are complementary, as stated in Proposition 6, leads the principal to optimally share control with
a reactive agent for intermediate levels of the conict of interest, while if activities interact as
substitutes or the agent is passive, control over activities is optimally allocated to the same party.
7.1 Benchmark: Exogenous Communication.
Suppose that communication is non-strategic and does not vary with the allocation of decision
rights. This benchmark is interesting in its own right since it covers the case in which the agents
information is too costly to communicate or process by the principal and as a result no e¤ective
communication takes place (i.e. the agent has "specic knowledge " in the sense of Jensen and
Meckling 1992), and also the case in which information manipulation and disclosure is not an issue
for the organization but the communication channel is inherently noisy.38
To this end dene a partition E of 
 into intervals and suppose that the principal only knows
to what interval the true state belongs. Furthermore, the interval that the principal observes is
common knowledge among the parties. Let
 
2   2E

be the residual variance associated with
partition E , where we explicitly allow the cases 2E = 0 (i.e. the agent has "specic knowledge"),
2E = 
2 (i.e. communication perfectly reveals the state to the principal) and the intermediate
cases of a noisy communication channel 0 < 2E < 
2. The loss to the principal under each organi-
zational arrangement with an exogenously given quality of communication is given by Proposition
7 where 2P and 
2
S are replaced by 
2
E . The following proposition describes the optimal allocation
of authority in this case.
PROPOSITION 8 (Allocation of Control: Exogenous Communication). Suppose that communica-
tion is non-strategic and does not vary with the allocation of decision rights. Let
 
2   2E

be the
38See, for instance, Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2006).
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residual variance of the message received by the principal. Then,39
i. Irrespective of the value of , S-Authority is never strictly optimal :
ii. Whenever
  
2   2E

=2

< 4a2 the principal centralizes decision making and
delegates all decisions to the agent if
  
2   2E

=2
  4a2, regardless of the value of .
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal allocation of control when communication is non-strategic and
2E = (3=4)
2. To understand why sharing control can never be optimal, note that when the
allocation of control does not a¤ect communication, the only benet from shared control over
centralization resides in the gain from local adaptation, while the principal must incur a loss of
control when she partially delegates to her agent. Therefore S-Authority is preferred to P-Authority
only if the conict of interest is su¢ ciently small relative to the informativeness of communication,
as given by the following condition  
2   2E

2
> m(a; ); (16)
where m(a; ) = 4a
2
1+2(a2 1) . However, a reduction in the conict of interest makes complete
delegation to the agent more attractive. For shared control to be preferred over delegation it must
be that the reduction in the loss of control 4LAC
2    4LSC2   LSC  2   2E outweighs the loss
of information (LX + LL)
 
2   2E

. Therefore, for S-Authority to dominate A-Authority it must
be the case that this loss of information is small relative to the gains in control, as given by the
following condition  
2   2E

2
< n(a; ); (17)
where n(a; ) = 4a
2+8a2
1 2(a2 1)+2 : In the proof of the proposition it is shown that m(a; )  n(a; )
implying that (16) and (17) cannot be satised simultaneously, and shared control is never strictly
optimal. In summary, when the allocation of decision rights does not a¤ect the quality of communi-
cation the principal may be willing to partially delegate to the agent if the quality of communication
is su¢ ciently low relative to the conict of interest. If this is the case, however, the principal always
gains by further relinquishing all decision rights to her agent, i.e. by engaging in A-Authority. Thus
in this symmetric model with exogenous communication, where the agent has the same adaptation
bias for each activity, there is no reason for the principal to delegate one activity while retaining
control over the other. Finally, part ii of Proposition 6 simply captures the idea that whenever the
39We take the stance that if the principal is indi¤erent between di¤erent allocations, she selects the allocation that
maximizes the number of decision rights transferred to the agent.
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agency costs of delegation are small relative to the informational advantage of the agent, decision
rights should be assigned to the best informed party.40
7.2 Optimal Allocation of Decision Rights when Communication is Strategic
If communication is strategic, the quality of communication will depend on the congruence of
preferences, nature of interaction between activities and the allocation of decision rights. The
following proposition characterizes the optimal allocation of decision rights in this case.
PROPOSITION 9 (Allocation of Control: Strategic Communication) Suppose a 6= 0, then 41
(i)-Complements: If  > 0; there exist aP < 0 and 0 <aR() < aR() such that
:
a.- If a 2 [aP ; aR()] A-Authority is optimal.
b.- If a < aP or a > aR() P-Authority is optimal.
c.- If a 2 [aR(); aR()] ; S-Authority is optimal.
d.-The range of values aR()  aR(), increases in :
(ii)-Substitutes: If  > 0; there exist threshold values cP < 0 < cR such that
a.- If a 2 [cP ; cR] A-Authority is optimal.
b.- If a < cP or a > cR P-Authority is optimal.
c.- Shared control is never optimal.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 5. Part (i-c) of the proposition captures our key result:
if communication is strategic, sharing control of complementary activities can be optimal. As
shown in Proposition 6, the principal can always improve the quality of communication by sharing
control over complementary activities. Thus part c of the proposition states the she is willing
"to trade control for information" only when the agent is reactive and the conict of interest is
mild. The fact that for a passive agent shared control is never optimal, despite the improved
communication, follows from the observation in Section 4.3 that communication with a passive
agent is comparatively worse than with a reactive agent. Thus, the qualitative di¤erence in the
communication equilibria between a passive and a reactive agent impacts the principals optimal
assignment of control rights. In particular, with a passive agent communication deteriorates in
such a way that it is not worthwhile for the principal to render some control over to the agent to
improve the informativeness of his message.
Furthermore, part i-d of the proposition states that the principal would tend to share control
more often with a reactive agent whenever the strength of the complementarity between decisions
intensies. To see this note that part (i-c) of Proposition 9 also states that the likelihood of sharing
40See Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
41The values of aR() and aR(); as well as aP ; cP and cR are explicitly derived in the proof of the proposition.
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control increases with the strength of the interaction between activities . This is driven by three
e¤ects: (i) as  increases the quality of communication under shared control increases , while the
quality of communication under centralization remains unchanged, (ii) the incremental value of
adapting both decisions to the state increases, i.e. the impact of the level of shared information
on performance is more pronounced, and (iii) the returns to control from centralizing one activity
increase. Therefore the communication advantage of shared control and the principals returns from
improved communication increase with the strength of the complementarity between activities,
raising the relative benet of shared control over centralization. Furthermore, the increase in the
returns to control increase the desirability of sharing control over delegation. The net e¤ect is
an increase willingness of the principal to share control whenever the strength of the interaction
increases.
The proposition indicates that the principal never nds it optimal to share control with her
agent if activities are substitutes. This follows from three observations: (i) As discussed in Section
6, under S-Authority the principal always benets from improved communication, (ii) following
Proposition 8, if the quality of communication under P-Authority and S-Authority is the same,
S-Authority is never optimal, and (iii) Proposition 6 states that P-Authority has a communication
advantage over S-Authority whenever activities are substitutes.
Parts i-a and ii-a of the proposition state that whenever the adaptation bias of the agent is
su¢ ciently small, the principal optimally transfers all decision rights to her agent. In essence,
when information transmission is strategic the loss under each allocation of control decreases as the
preferences of principal and agent become more congruent, and eventually vanishes when a = 0. It
follows that all organizational arrangements achieve the rst-best decision making when the agent
and principal are perfectly aligned. Introducing a small conict jaj in this case, however, will have
a zero rst order e¤ect on the quadratic loss of control under A-Authority and S-Authority but it
would yield a strictly positive reduction of the quality of communication both under P-Authority
and S-Authority. This follows from the observation that lim
jaj!0
 
a2=
 
2   2k

= 0; l 2 fP; Sg.42
In consequence, when the agents preferences are su¢ ciently aligned the principal optimally avoids
communication and transfers control over both activities to the agent.
Finally, when the conict of interest is extreme the principal retains all decision rights, i.e.
P-Authority is optimal. This is stated in parts (i-b) and (ii-b) of the proposition. To see this, note
42This result mirrors a main insight in Dessein (2002) that the ratio of the quality of communication to the loss
under delegation grows indenitely as the preferences become perfectly congruent. In contrast to our present setup,
Dessein (2002) derives this result for the case where the di¤erence between principals and agents preferred choices
is constant and for general distributions of the state space.
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that the principal can always bound her loss by making both decisions herself without recourse
to the information of the agent. This ensures her a maximum loss in decision making of LX2.
Since delegating some (or all decisions) to the agent incurs in a loss proportional to a2; when jaj is
su¢ ciently large the loss of control outweighs the benet of incorporating information into decision
making through A-Authority or S-Authority, and as a result P-Authority is optimal.
8 Conclusions
This paper aims at furthering our understanding of the determinants of authority in organizations
by analyzing the optimal allocation of decision rights between an uninformed principal and an
informed but biased agent when interdependent activities need to be adapted to local conditions.
A key insight of the analysis is that the assignment of control rights impacts the informativeness
of communication between principal and agent when information transmission takes place under
cheap talk. In the simple framework analyzed, when activities are complementary the principal
can always obtain more precise information by putting the agent in charge of one activity, that is
shared control of complementary activities leads to better communication. Conversely, letting the
agent control one activity worsens communication when activities interact as substitutes.
The central result in this paper is that the principal nds it optimal to share control over
complementary activities solely because of the improved communication, i.e. the principal optimally
"trades control for information". This is true in our model if cheap talk is su¢ ciently informative,
which is the case when the agent has an incentive to overstate his private information. When the
agents incentive is to understate his private information, the communication advantage of shared
control over complementary activities is not su¢ cient to o¤set the principals loss from biased
decision making.
When an organization needs to make a single decision Dessein (2002) showed that the principal
is in general better o¤ delegating control rather than engaging in communication, specially if the
conict of interest is not too pronounced. While this insight remains true in the present model, I also
nd that the principal may delegate some control to the agent precisely to improve communication.
Thus, the comparison between delegation and centralization with multiple, interdependent decisions
showcases a new e¤ect: the principal may want to put the agent in charge of one activity because
she obtains better information to make decisions on other activities.
The basic model analyzed in this paper could be extended in several directions. First, the
model posits a symmetric conict of interest across activities. This implies, for instance, that the
performance of the organization under shared control is independent of the activity delegated to
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the agent and that shared control when communication is non-strategic is never optimal. While it
is clear that both features of our model are not robust to the possibility of asymmetric agency costs
across activities, the communication advantage of shared control over complementary activities
is likely to hold in more general cases.43 Second, while the analysis assumes that some level of
congruence between principal and agent exists, possibly through the use of some incentive scheme,
I do not endogenize the design of such scheme. I leave the organizational design problem of jointly
determining the allocation of decision rights and the provision of incentives for future research.
9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.:i- A-Authority : Follows immediately by solving for yAi (); i 2 f1; 2g ; in the
decision rules (5).
ii- P-Authority : Letting p ( j m) denote the posterior belief of the principal after receiving message
m; the principal will set
 
yP1 (m); y
P
2 (m)

according to
 
yP1 (m); y
P
2 (m)
 2 arg max
(y01;y02)
E
 (y01   )2   (y02   )2 + 2y01y02 jm ;
which implies that
yPi (m) =
1
1  E [ jm ] ; i 2 f1; 2g :
iii- S-Authority. Let y2(;m) be an arbitrary integrable decision rule for the agent, and let p ( j m)
be the posterior belief of the principal after receiving message m. The principals optimal response
y1(m) to y2(;m); dened as
y1(m) 2 argmax
(y01)
E
 (y01   )2   (y2(;m)  )2 + 2y01y2(;m) jm ;
satises the rst order condition
E
 2(y01   ) + 2y2(;m) jm = 0:
Therefore y1(m) = E [ jm ] +E [y2(;m) jm ] : The agents optimal choice given the principals
strategy y1(m) and his message m is simply given by his reaction curve (5), i.e. y2(;m) =
(1 + a) + y1(m). In equilibrium the agents strategy must satisfy
y2(;m) = (1 + a) + E [ + y2(;m) jm ] : (18)
43This communication advantage would need to be rephrased with respect to Proposition 6 in the following way:
when activities are complementary, the principal can always nd an activity that if delegated to the agent improves
communication.
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Taking expectations in (18) it follows that E [y2(;m) jm ] =

(1 + a+ ) =
 
1  2E [ jm ] ; and
thus the principals and agents optimal decision are given by (8). 
The proof of propositions 2 and 4 will make use of the following lemma that establishes that all
communication equilibria are interval equilibria, and derives the relation between the end points of
consecutive intervals.
LEMMA 2 (Interval Equilibria and Arbitrage Condition). Every communication equilibria aN
under P-Authority or S-Authority is an interval equilibria, where consecutive intervals satisfy
ai+1   ai = ai   ai 1 + 4blai; l 2 fP; Sg : (19)
Proof : a-Interval Equilibria. We discuss the case of P-Authority and S-Authority separately.
P-Authority: Under P-Authority the agent can only a¤ect decision making through the posterior
belief induced on the principal. Thus the agent can only induce decisions in the set
P =

(y1; y2) : y1 = y2 =
1
1  
e;e 2 [0; s]
Now dene euA e;  = uA( 11 e; 11 e; ). It readily follows that @2@e@ euA e;  = 4 1+a1  > 0 and
@2
@2e euA e;  =   41  , i.e. euA e;  is concave in its rst argument and supermodular. To show
that all equilibria are interval equilibria, it su¢ ces to prove that when the state increases the
agent wants to induce a (weakly) higher posterior mean on the principal. Suppose that this is
not the case, i.e. there exist two states 2 > 1 and two expected posteriors e2 > e1 such that
the agent at state 1 prefers to induce e2 and at state 2 prefers to induce e1. This implies thateuA e2; 1 > euA e1; 1 and euA e1; 2 > euA e2; 2. It follows that
euA e2; 1  euA e1; 1 > euA e2; 2  euA e1; 2 ;
which contradicts the fact that @
2
@e@ euA e;  > 0. Therefore it must be that, in equilibrium, the
agent induces weakly higher posteriors (and thus decisions) as the state increases.
S-Authority: Under S-Authority the agent can inuence the principals choice of y1 both through
his message and his optimal response. However, sequential rationality requires the agents response
to be optimal given the principals equilibrium choice. Now dene buA (y1; ) = max
y2
uA(y1; y2; ).
It readily follows that @
2
@y1@
buA (y1; ) = 2(1 + a)(1 + ) > 0 and @2@2y1 buA (y1; ) =  2(1 + 2) < 0,
i.e. buA (y1; ) is concave in its rst argument and supermodular. To show that all equilibria are
interval equilibria we need to establish that when the state increases the agent wants to induce
a (weakly) higher posterior decision y1. Suppose that this is not the case, i.e. there exist two
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states  >  and two decisions y1 > y1, such that the agent at state  prefers to induce decision
y1 and at state  prefers to induce the decision y1. This implies that buA (y1; ) > buA y1;  andbuA  y1;  < buA y1; . But then we have that
buA (y1; )  buA y1;  > buA  y1;   buA y1;  ;
which contradicts the fact that @
2
@y1@
buA (y1; ) > 0. Therefore it must be that in equilibrium the
agent induces a weakly higher decision y1 as the state increases.
b-Indi¤erence condition: We discuss the case of P-Authority and S-Authority separately.
P-Authority: Consider a partition aN , N  2; and two consecutive intervals (ai 1; ai) and
(ai; ai+1). After receiving messagemi 1 2 (ai 1; ai) the principal selects decisions (y1i 1; y2i 1) and
after receiving message mi 2 (ai; ai+1) the principal selects decisions (y1i; y2i): It follows from (7)
that after messagemi the principal will select y1i = y2i = 11 E [ jmi ] = 11 

ai+ai+1
2

 eyi: Then
at state ai the agent is indi¤erent between sending message mi 1 and mi i¤ uA (eyi 1; eyi 1; ai) =
uA (eyi; eyi; ai) ; which implies
KA +

 2 (eyi 1   (1 + a) ai)2 + 2 (eyi 1)2 = KA +  2(eyi   (1 + a) ai)2 + 2 (eyi)2 ;
(1  )eyi + (1  )eyi 1 = 2 (1 + a) ai;
(ai + ai+1) + (ai 1 + ai) = 4 (1 + a) ai;
ai+1   ai = ai   ai 1 + 4aai;
which is equivalent to (19) with bP = a:
S-Authority: Consider a partition aN ; N  2; and two consecutive interval (ai 1; ai) and
(ai; ai+1). After receiving message mi 1 2 (ai 1; ai) the principal selects y1i 1 according to (8):
It follows from (8) that after message mi the principal will select y1i =

1
1  +
a
1 2

E [ jmi ] =
1
1  +
a
1 2

ai+ai+1
2

 byi: Then the agent of type ai is indi¤erent between sending messagemi 1
and mi i¤ max
y2
uA (byi 1; y2; ai) = max
y2
uA (byi; y2; ai), or, alternatively, buA (byi 1; ai) = buA (byi; ai) ;
which implies
KA +

  (byi 1   (1 + a) ai)2   ((1 + a)ai + byi 1   (1 + a) ai)2 + 2 (byi 1) ((1 + a) + byi 1) =
= KA +
  (byi   (1 + a) ai)2   ((1 + a)ai + byi   (1 + a) ai)2 + 2 (byi) ((1 + a) + byi) ;
2 (1 + a) ai = (1  ) byi + (1  ) byi 1;
4 (1 + ) (1 + a)
(1 + (1 + a))
ai = ai + ai+1 + ai + ai 1;
ai+1   ai = ai   ai 1 + 4 a
(1 + (1 + a))
ai;
33
which is equivalent to (19) with bS = a(1+(1+a)) :
The proofs of propositions 3, 5 and 7 will make use of the following lemma that provides
conditions under which the expected utility of the principal and the agent increase with the infor-
mativeness of equilibrium.
LEMMA 3 (Expected Utility of Principal and Agent under Communication Equilibria).The ex-
pected utility of principal and agent increase with the informativeness of communication whenever
i-P-Authority a-Principals expected utility increases if

1
1 

> 0:
b-Agents expected utility increases if

1
1 

> 0 and bP >  12 :
ii-S-Authority a-Principals expected utility increases if bS < 12 :
b-Agents expected utility increases if bS >  12 :
Proof : Let aN be a communication equilibrium, and for any message m 2 (ai 1; ai) let m =
E [ jm ] :We analyze rst P-Authority.
P-Authority: The expected utility of the principal E [uP (y1; y2; ) jm ] satises
E [uP (y1; y2; ) jm ] = E
"
 ( m
1     )
2   ( m
1     )
2 + 2

m
1  
2#
=
= 2

1
1  

E

2
  E h2   (m)2i : (20)
Thus the expected utility of the principal increases with the informativeness of communication if
1= (1  ) > 0. Since this condition is always satised, under P-Authority the principals is ex-ante
better o¤ with improved communication.
The expected utility of the agent E [uA (y1; y2; ) jm ] satises
E [uA (y1; y2; ) jm ] = E
"
 ( m
1     (1 + a) )
2   ( m
1     (1 + a) )
2 + 2

m
1  
2#
=
= 2

1
1  

E
h
(1 + 2a) (m)2   (1 + a)2 (1  ) 2
i
:
Therefore the agent benets from improved communication if (1=1  ) (1 + 2a) > 0, which is
satised whenever bP >  12 :
S-Authority: Given equilibrium decisions (8), the expected utility of the principal E [uP (y1; y2; ) jm ]
under S-Authority satises
E [uP (y1; y2; ) jm ] = E[ (1 + (a+ 1)
1  2 m  )
2   ((a+ 1) + 
1  2 m+
(a+ 1) (  m)  )2 + 2 1 + (a+ 1)
1  2 m

(a+ 1) + 
1  2 m+ (a+ 1) (  m)

](21)
=
( (a+ 1) + 1) (1 +    a)
1  2 E

m2
   1 + a2E 2 ; (22)
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where we have made use of the fact that E [E [ jm ]] = E
h
(E [ jm ])2
i
: Thus E [uP (y1; y2; ) jm ]
increases with E

m2

if ( (a+ 1) + 1) (1 +    a) > 0 which, by (13), can be simplied to
1  2bS > 0.
Likewise, given equilibrium decisions (8), the expected utility of the agent E [uA (y1; y2; ) jm ]
satises
E [uA (y1; y2; ) jm ] = E[ (1 + (a+ 1)
1  2 m (a+ 1) )
2 ((a+ 1) + 
1  2 m+(a+ 1) (  m) (a+ 1) )
2+
+(a+ 1) (  m)  (a+ 1) )2 + 2 1 + (a+ 1)
1  2 m

(a+ 1) + 
1  2 m+ (a+ 1) (  m)

;
E [uA (y1; y2; ) jm ] = (2a+ 1 + (1 + a)) (1 + (1 + a))
1  2 E

m2
  ((a+ 1) + 1)2 E 2 :
Thus E [uA (y1; y2; ) jm ] increases with E

m2

if (2a+ 1 + (1 + a)) (1 + (1 + a)) > 0 which,
by (13), can be simplied to 1 + 2bS > 0:
Proof of Proposition 2 For a given communication equilibrium, parts (i.-iv.) follow from Lemma
1-ii, Lemma 1-iii, and Lemma 2. To show that an equilibrium aN exists for each N; we construct
for each N an equilibrium with N intervals
Using the boundary conditions a0 = 0 and aN = s to solve the di¤erence equation (19) gives
ai =
xiH   yiH
xNH   yNH
s for 0  i  N; (23)
where xH and yH are
xH = (2bl + 1) + 2
p
bl(1 + bl) and
yH = (2bl + 1)  2
p
bl(1 + bl),
and satisfy xH yH = 1. Therefore ai is well dened and ai  ai 1; 1  i  N; thus aN is a
communication equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3: We rst compute the variance of communication for each equilibrium
with N intervals, and show that this variance is increasing in N . We then compute the limit value
as N !1 . The proof that the limit of strategy proles and beliefs constitutes a communication
equilibria can be found in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006).
Consider a communication equilibrium aN . To compute the residual variance of communication
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2   2l we rst compute E

m2

where m = E [ jm ].
E

m2

=
NX
i=1
Z ai
ai 1

ai + ai 1
2
2 1
s
d =
1
4s
NX
i=1
(ai   ai 1) (ai + ai 1)2 =
=
1
4s
NX
i=1
  
a3i   a3i 1

+ aiai 1 (ai   ai 1)

=
=
1
4s
 
s3 +
s3 
xNH   yNH
3 NX
i=1
 
xiH   yiH
  
xi 1H   yi 1H
  
xiH   yiH   xi 1H + yi 1H
!
=
=
s2
4
(1 +
1 
xNH   yNH
3 NX
i=1
[x3iH
 
x 1H   x 2H

+ xiH
 
2  xH + x 2H   2x 1H

+y3iH
 
y 2H   y 1H

+ yiH
  2 + yH   y 2H + 2y 1H ])
=
s2
4
(1 +
1 
xNH   yNH
3 [
 
x3NH   1

xH 
x2H + xH + 1
    xNH   1  x2H   xH + 1
xH
 
 
y3NH   1

yH 
y2H + yH + 1
 +  yNH   1  y2H   yH + 1
yH
)]) =
=
s2
4
 
1 +
x3NH   y3NH 
xNH   yNH
3 xH xH + x2H + 1   1 xNH   yNH 2
 
x2H   xH + 1

xH
!
where the last equality follows from
yH 
yH + y2H + 1
 = xH 
xH + x2H + 1
 ; 
y2H   yH + 1

yH
=
 
x2H   xH + 1

xH
:
Since xH yH = 1 and letting p = x2NH we obtain
E

m2

=
s2
4
 
1 +
 
p  x2H
  
px2H   1
 
xH + x2H + 1

(p  1)2 xH
!
;
2l = E

m2
  s2
4
=
s2
4
  
p  x2H
  
px2H   1
 
xH + x2H + 1

(p  1)2 xH
!
:
It is straightforward to show that E

m2

increases in p: Since xH > 1 it follows that E

m2

(and thus 2l ) increases in N . From Lemma 3, if bl > 0 (which requires a > 0) then the agent
always benets from improved communication. The principal always benets from improved com-
munication with a reactive agent under P-Authority, and benets from improved communication
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with a reactive agent under S-Authority if, and only if, bS < 12 : From Assumption 2 we have that
bS <
1
2 . Thus the most informative equilibrium Pareto dominates all other equilibria. We next
compute the residual variance of the agents message for this case.
From lim
N!1
(p x2H)(px2H 1)
(xH+x2H+1)(p 1)2xH
= xH
x2H+xH+1
we have
lim
N!1
E

m2

=
s2
4

1 +
xH
x2H + xH + 1

=
s2
4
(xH + 1)
2
x2H + xH + 1
=
bl + 1
4bl + 3
s2:
Therefore for the most informative equilibrium we have
2   2l = E

2
  E m2 = s2
3
  bl + 1
4bl + 3
s2 =
4bl
4bl + 3
2:

Proof of Proposition 4: For a given communication equilibrium, parts (i.-iv.) follow from
Lemma 1-ii, Lemma 1-iii, and Lemma 2. We now show that an equilibrium aN exists for each
N  N and thus the number of equilibria is necessarily nite.
Consider a partition aN . To solve the second order di¤erence equation (19) we note that the
roots of the characteristic equation are given by (with j =
p 1 being the imaginary unit)
xH = (2bl + 1) + 2j
p
jblj (1 + bl) = cos'+ j sin', and
yH = (2bl + 1)  2j
p
jblj (1 + bl) = cos'  j sin';
where the angle ' is dened implicitly by tan' = 2
p
jblj(1+bl)
(2bl+1)
; 2  '  2 . Therefore, the general
solution to (19) is given by ai = 2 cos (i'+  ). To determine  and  we use the boundary
conditions a0 = 0 and aN = s to obtain
2 cos = 0
2 cos (N'+  ) = s;
which yields 2 = ssinN' and  =  2 : It follows that each element of the partition is given by
ai = s
cos
 
i'  2

sinN'
= s
sin i'
sinN'
: (24)
Monotonicity condition: The sequence of end-points faigi=Ni=0 will qualify as an equilibrium of the
communication game only if the monotonicity condition ai  ai 1; 1  i  N , holds. From (24)
this requires that
sin i'  sin (i  1)'
sinN'
=
2 cos
 
i  12

' sin '2
sinN'
 0;
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which implies cos
 
i  12

'  0, 1  i  N , or, alternatively, -2 
 
i  12

'  2 : Since for
bl < 0 we have ' 6= 0 then there exists an integer N(bl) such that
 N(bl)  12'  2 and N(bl) + 12' > 2 ; i.e. for a given bl < 0 the number of communication equilibria is necessarily
nite. In particular, N(bl) satises

2 j'j  
1
2
< N(bl)  
2 j'j +
1
2
:
Also, if bl <  12 then N(bl) = 1; i.e. the only equilibrium is the babbling equilibrium in which
no information is transmitted.
Proof of Proposition 5: To compute the residual variance 2   2l we rst compute E

m2

where m = E [ jm ] :
E

m2

=
NX
i=1
Z ai
ai 1

ai + ai 1
2
2 1
s
d =
1
4s
NX
i=1
(ai   ai 1) (ai + ai 1)2
=
1
4s
NX
i=1
  
a3i   a3i 1

+ aiai 1 (ai   ai 1)

=
1
4s
  
a3N   a30

+
NX
i=1
aiai 1 (ai   ai 1)
!
=
1
4s
 
s3 +
s3
(sinN')3
NX
i=1
(sin i' sin (i  1)' (sin i'  sin (i  1)'))
!
:
From sin (i  1)' = sin i' cos'  cos i' sin' we obtain, after some calculations,
E

m2

=
s2
4
 
1 + cos'  sin'
(sinN')3
NX
i=1
 
sin2 i' cos i'+ sin2(i  1)' cos(i  1)'!
=
s2
4
 
1 + cos'  sin'
(sinN')3
NX
i=1
 
cos i'  cos3 i'+ cos(i  1)'  cos3(i  1)'! :
In order to compute the summation terms we note that (with Re [] denoting the real part of the
complex number )
NX
i=1
 
cos i'  cos3 i'+ cos(i  1)'  cos3(i  1)' = Re" NX
i=1

eji'   ej3i' + ej(i 1)'   ej3(i 1)'
#
=
Re

1 + ej'
1  ej'
 
1  ejN'  1 + ej3'
1  ej3'
 
1  ej3N' = Re" j
tan '2
 
1  ejN'  j
tan 3'2
 
1  ej3N'!# =
sinN'
tan '2
  sin 3N'
tan 3'2
=
sinN'
tan '2
  3 sinN'  4 (sinN')
3
tan 3'2
:
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where the last inequality follows from sin 3N' = 3 sinN'  4 (sinN')3 : Thus
E

m2

=
s2
4
 
1 + cos'  1
4
sin'
(sinN')2
 
tan 3'2   3 tan '2
tan 3'2 tan
'
2
!
  sin'
tan 3'2
!
: (25)
From cos' = 2bl + 1, sin' = 2
p
(bl + 1) jblj, tan '2 = sin'1+cos' =
q
jblj
1+bl
and tan 3'2 =
3 tan '
2
 tan3 '
2
1 3 tan2 '
2
we have
sin'
 
tan 3'2   3 tan '2
tan 3'2 tan
'
2
!
= (1 + cos')
 
1  3 tan
'
2
tan 3'2
!
= 2 (bl + 1)

1  31  3 tan
2 '
2
3  tan2 '2

= 16
(bl + 1) jblj
4bl + 3
;
sin'
tan 3'2
= (1 + cos')
tan '2
tan 3'2
= 2 (bl + 1)
(4bl + 1)
(4bl + 3)
;
which applied to (25) implies
E

m2

=
s2
4

2 (bl + 1)  4
(sinN')2
(bl + 1) jblj
4bl + 3
  2 (bl + 1) 4bl + 1
4bl + 3

=
=
bl + 1
4bl + 3

1  jblj
(sinN')2

s2: (26)
We also note that as N increases the variance of the message 2l also increases, i.e. the informative-
ness of equilibrium increases with the number of messages sent by the agent. For the equilibrium
with the maximum number of partitions N(bl) we have that the quality of communication is given
by
2   2l =
s2
3
  bl + 1
4bl + 3

1  jblj
(sinN (bl)')
2

s2 =
4 jblj
4bl + 3

3 (1 + bl)
sin2N (bl)'
  1

2:
Pareto dominance. From Lemma 3 the principals expected utility increases in 2l under P-Authority
and S-Authority (the latter given Assumption 2). Thus the principal prefers the equilibrium aN(bl)
to any other equilibrium. Also from Lemma 3 the agent benets from more communication if and
only if, bl >  12 ; l 2 fP; Sg. As discussed above, however, when bl   12 the only communication
equilibrium is the babbling equilibrium. Thus the agent always prefers the most informative equi-
librium to any other equilibria and as a result the most informative equilibrium Pareto dominates
all other equilibria. 
Proof of Proposition 6: We rst show that the quality of communication is decreasing when-
ever the communication bias jblj ; l 2 fP; Sg ; increases. Then we establish that if activities interact
as complements the communication bias under S-Authority jbS j is smaller than the communication
bias under P-Authority jbP j where the reverse is true in activities interact as substitutes.
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In the case of a reactive agent @
 
2   2l

=@bl =
12
(4bl+3)
2 > 0 which indicates that increasing
bl worsens communication. For a passive agent we rst note that 2   2l is a continuous function
of bl and admits a derivative except when ' (bl) = 2N+1 for each N  1 (this corresponds to the
values of the communication bias where the number of intervals of the most informative equilibrium
vary). If 2   2l is di¤erentiable we have that
@
 
2   2l

@bl
=
 12
(4bl + 3)
2

4b2l + 6bl + 3
(sinN (bl)')
2   1

+
jblj (bl + 1)(4bl + 3)
(sinN (bl)')
4 2N (bl) (sin 2N (bl))
@'
@bl

It then follows from sin 2N (bl) < 0;
@'
@bl
< 0; and 4b2l+6bl+3 > 1 if bl >  1=2; that @
 
2   2l

=@bl <
0. Thus reducing jblj ; l 2 fP; Sg ; improves the quality of communication with a passive agent.
Comparing the communication bias under P-Authority and S-Authority we have that bP  
bS = a   a= (1 +  (a+ 1)) = a (a+ 1) = ( + a + 1). From our assumptions it follows that
(a+ 1) = ( + a + 1) > 0. Therefore for a reactive agent a > 0 and thus bP > bS i¤  > 0.
Likewise for a passive agent a < 0 and thus bP < bS i¤  > 0. In summary, jbP j > jbS j if activities
interact as complements, and jbP j < jbS j if activities interact as substitutes.
Finally, since @ jbS j =@ =   (a+ 1) jaj = ( + a + 1)2 < 0 and bP does not vary with ; we
conclude that increasing  improves communication under S-Authority while it does not a¤ect the
quality of communication under P-Authority.
Proof of Proposition 7: The principals expected utility under the rst-best decision making (2)
is given by
E

uP
 
yP1 () ; y
P
1 () ; 

= 2


1  

E

2

: (27)
P-Authority : When the principal relies on the information provided by the agent then her expected
utility is given in (20). Comparing now (27) and (20) we have that the loss of information under
P-Authority is
LPI = E

uP
 
yP1 () ; y
P
1 () ; 
  E uP  yP1 (m); yP2 (m);  jm =
= 2

1
1  
 
2   2P

: (28)
A-Authority : The principals expected utility in this case is
E

uP
 
yA1 (); y
A
2 (); 

= 2
a2   
1   E

2

; (29)
and thus the loss of control under A-Authority is given by comparing (27) and (29)
LAC = E

uP
 
yP1 () ; y
P
1 () ; 
  E uP  yP1 (m); yP2 (m);  jm =
= 2
a2
1  E

2

= 4
2a2
1  
2: (30)
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S-Authority : The principals expected utility is given by (22). Therefore the loss with respect to
the rst best (27) is
LS = 2


1  

E

2

+
 
1 + a2

E

2
  (1 + )2   a22
1  2 E
h
(E [ jm ])2
i
=
=
a2
1  2E

2

+
(1 + )2   a22
1  2 E
h
(E [ jm ]  )2
i
=
=
a2
1  2 4
2 +

2

1
1  

  a
2
1  2 +
 
a2   1  2   2S : (31)

Proof of Proposition 8: If communication is exogenous the loss under each organizational form
is given by
LP = 2

1
1  
 
2   2E

;
LA = 4
2a2
1  
2;
LS = 4
a2
1  2
2 +
(1 + )2   a22
1  2
 
2   2E

:
We proceed now to make pairwise comparisons between organizational forms. In particular, A-
Authority dominates P-Authority whenever
2

1
1  
 
2   2E

> 4
2a2
1  
2;
or
 
2   2E

=2  4a2. For shared control to dominate centralization it must be that
4
a2
1  2
2 +
(1 + )2   a22
1  2
 
2   2E

< 2

1
1  
 
2   2E

;
which reduces to the condition 
2   2E

2
>
4a2
1 + 2 (a2   1)  m(a; ): (32)
Alternatively, for shared control to dominate delegation we must have that
4
a2
1  2
2 +
(1 + )2   a22
1  2
 
2   2E

< 4
2a2
1  
2;
which reduces to  
2   2E

=2 <
4a2 (1 + 2)
(1 + )2   2a2  n(a; ): (33)
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with n(a; ) > 0 from Assumptions 2 and 3. Comparing (32) and (33) and the fact that
 
2   2E

=2 <
1; shared control is optimal only if
n(a; ) m(a; ) > 0; (34)
n(a; ) < 1: (35)
Condition (34) can be written using (32) and (33) as
8 ( + 1)
 
a2   1 a22 
a22 + 1  2 (1 + )2   2a2 > 0:
It is readily seen that this expression is only satised if a > 1. However noting that n(1; ) = 4
and that @n(a;)@a > 0 we can see that conditions (34) and (35) are mutually exclusive. Therefore
shared control cannot simultaneously dominate P-Authority and A-Authority when the quality of
communication is exogenously given and does not depend on the allocation of decision rights.
Proof of Proposition 9: We rst proof the case where activities interact as substitutes and then
proceed to the proof for complementary activities.
i- Substitutes. We rst note that if activities interact as substitutes, shared control can never be
strictly optimal. This follows immediately from the fact that under Assumption 3 the principal
always increases the loss under S-Authority as the total amount of information worsens and, from
Proposition 8, if the quality of communication under P-Authority and S-Authority is the same then
S-Authority can never be optimal. We now investigate under what conditions the principal will
centralize all decision making or delegate both activities to the agent.
If the agent has an incentive to overstate his private information (thus a > 0) by (28) and (30)
P-Authority dominates A-Authority whenever 
2   2P

2
< 4a2: (36)
Reactive agent : By using (14) with bP = a it can readily be seen that (36) is satised if and only
if 4a  1 < 0. Thus whenever the conict of interest a is su¢ ciently large (i.e. a > cR = 1=4) the
principal centralizes decision making and for 0 < a < 1=4 delegation takes place.
Passive agent : If the agent has an incentive to understate his private information (thus a < 0) the
quality of communication under P-Authority is given by (15) with bP = a. By noting that 
2   2P

2
 4 jblj
4bl + 3
[3 (1 + bl)  1] =  4a (3a+ 2)
4a+ 3
; (37)
and [ 4a (3a+ 2)] = (4a+ 3) > 4a2 for  1=2 < a < 0, we have that A-Authority dominates P-
Authority if the adaptation bias is larger than  1=2. Since for a   1=2 the agents message is
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completely uninformative (i.e. 2   2P = 2), condition (36) is always satised and P-Authority
dominates A-Authority if a <  1=2.
ii- Complements: If activities interact as complements shared control has a communication advan-
tage over centralization. Since the quality of communication is qualitatively di¤erent for a passive
and reactive agent we analyze each case separately.
Reactive agent : Comparing the loss under A-Authority and S-Authority, with
 
2   2S

given by
(14) and bS given by (13), we have that S-Authority dominates A-Authority if
8
a2
1  
2   4
 
   a2 + 4a2 + 3a+ 1 a
(4a+ 3 + 3a + 3) (1  )
2 > 0;
4
(4a   + 7a   1) (a+ 1) a
(4a+ 3 + 3a + 3) (1  )
2 > 0:
Thus S-Authority dominates A-Authority whenever 4a    + 7a   1 > 0. Therefore the prin-
cipal is indi¤erent between sharing control and delegating to the agent whenever a =aR () =
( + 1) = (7 + 4) :
Comparing now the loss under P-Authority and S-Authority, where
 
2   2P

is given by (15)
and bS given by (13), we have that S-Authority dominates P-Authority if
8
a
(4a+ 3) (1  )
2   4
 
   a2 + 4a2 + 3a+ 1 a
(4a+ 3 + 3a + 3) (1  )
2 > 0; 
8a+ a + 16a2   3   4a2   3 (a+ 1) a
(4a+ 3 + 3a + 3) (4a+ 3) (1  ) 
2 > 0:
Thus S-Authority dominates P-Authority whenever
 
8a+ a + 16a2   3   4a2   3 > 0. There-
fore the principal is indi¤erent between sharing control and delegating to the agent whenever
a = aR () =
hp
160   472 + 256     8
i
= [8 (4  )] : For aR (0) =aR (0) = 1=4 and for  > 0
aR () >aR (). Furthermore, it can be shown that dd [aR ()  aR ()] > 0: In summary, whenever
a 2 (aR () ; aR ()) sharing control is strictly optimal, while if a < aR () A-Authority is optimal
and for a > aR () the principal nds it optimal to centralize all decision making.
Passive agent : Comparing the loss under A-Authority and S-Authority as given by (30) and (31),
with
 
2   2S

given by (14) and bS as in (13), we have that S-Authority dominates A-Authority
if
8
a2
1  
2   a
2
1  2 4
2 >
(1 + )2   a22
1  2
 
2   2S

; 
2   2S

2
< 4
(2 + 1) a2
(1 + )2   a22  p(a; ):
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However the quality of communication under S-Authority in this case is bounded from below by 
2   2S

2
>
4 jbS j
4bS + 3
[3 (1 + bS)  1] =  4 (3a+ 2 + 2a + 2) a
(4a+ 3 + 3a + 3) ( + a + 1)
 q(a; ): (38)
It can be veried that q(a; ) > p(a; ) for  1=2 < a < 0 implying that A-Authority dominates
S-Authority if the adaptation bias is larger than  1=2. Comparing now the loss under P-Authority
and S-Authority as given by (28) and (31) (with
 
2   2S

given by (15), bS as in (13),
 
2   2P

given by (15) and bP as in (11)) we have that P-Authority dominates S-Authority if
2

1
1  
 
2   2P

< 4
a2
1  2
2 +
(1 + )2   a22
1  2
 
2   2S

: (39)
We need only verify this inequality for a <  1=2 since for a >  1=2 P-Authority and S-
Authority are both dominated by A-Authority. Noting that for a <  1=2 we have 2   2P = 2,
(39) simplies to  
2   2S

2
> 2
1 +    2a2
(1 + )2   a22 :
Next we have that for a <  1=2; 2  1 +    2a2 < 4 (2 + 1) a2 which implies that.
2
1 +    2a2
(1 + )2   a22 < p(a; ):

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